The parties did not stipulate an issue for the Arbitrator to resolve, and the Arbitrator did not expressly frame one. Instead, the Arbitrator characterized the dispute as a “challenge [to the three-day] suspension imposed on the grievant, for failure to complete work assigned to him, by [his] supervisor . . . by the required date.”^[1] 

 

Before the Arbitrator, the Union claimed that the grievant’s supervisor had agreed “not to impose any penalty” if the grievant submitted the report by a certain date.^[2] The Union also claimed that the supervisor’s denial of any such agreement was biased and inaccurate. But the Arbitrator credited the supervisor’s “express[] deni[al]” of the Union’s claim, finding it “honest and straight forward [sic].”^[3]     

 

 

 

The Union claims that the award is contrary to law because the Arbitrator did not apply the required legal standards for sustaining a disciplinary action.^[4] Relying on Douglas v. Veterans Administration (Douglas)^[5] and U.S. Department of the Air Force,   Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona    (Davis-Monthan),^[6] the Union argues that for an arbitrator to sustain a disciplinary action, the agency must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) there is a nexus between the charged misconduct and the efficiency of the service; and (2) the disciplinary action is reasonable.^[7] Moreover, the Union argues, the grievant was treated unreasonably because other employees who engaged in the same conduct were not disciplined.^[8] But, the Union asserts, the Arbitrator erred by failing to make factual findings or provide any legal analysis applying these standards when the Arbitrator upheld the grievant’s suspension.^[9]   

 

When an exception involves an award’s consistency with law, the Authority reviews any question of law raised by the exception and the award de novo.^[10] In applying the standard of de novo review, the Authority assesses whether an arbitrator’s legal conclusions are consistent with the applicable standard of law.^[11] In making that assessment, the Authority defers to the arbitrator’s underlying factual findings.^[12]

The Union’s reliance on Douglas is misplaced. Arbitrators are not required to consider the Douglas factors in cases involving suspensions of fourteen days or less.^[13] As this case involves a three-day suspension, the Arbitrator was not required to apply the Douglas factors, and the Union’s exception provides no basis for finding the award contrary to law on this ground.^[14]   

 

Additionally, Davis-Monthan, on which the Union also relies, is inapposite. As pertinent here,   Davis-Monthan involved an essence, not a            contrary-to-law exception. In Davis-Monthan, the arbitrator reduced the grievant’s suspension, finding that the agency did not treat the grievant in a “fair and equitable manner,” as required by the parties’ agreement, when it disciplined the grievant differently than another employee for similar misconduct.^[15] Before the Authority, the agency argued that the award failed to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement – not that the award was contrary to law.^[16] The Authority upheld the award, finding that the arbitrator’s mitigation of the discipline imposed by the agency represented a plausible interpretation of the parties’ agreement.^[17] Because Davis-Monthan does not deal with contrary-to-law matters, the Union’s contrary-to-law exception based on Davis-Monthan does not demonstrate that the award is deficient on that ground.

 

 

 

The Union contends that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority because he failed to resolve two issues. One issue is whether there was a nexus “between the alleged misconduct and the efficiency of [the] service.”^[18] The other issue is whether the three-day suspension was for just cause. ^[19]

 

Arbitrators exceed their authority when they fail to resolve an issue submitted to arbitration, resolve an issue not submitted to arbitration, disregard specific limitations on their authority, or award relief to those not encompassed within the grievance.^[20] In the absence of a stipulation concerning the issue to be resolved at arbitration, arbitrators are accorded great deference in their formulation, or their characterization, of the issue.^[21] 

 

Here, the parties did not stipulate, and the Arbitrator did not frame, the issue to be resolved. But the Arbitrator characterized the purpose of the arbitration as a challenge to the grievant’s three-day suspension.^[22] Based on the evidence before him, the Arbitrator decided not to cancel the grievant’s three-day suspension.^[23] In doing so, the Arbitrator rejected the Union’s arguments challenging the suspension, and credited the Agency’s evidence. Because the award is directly responsive to the issue in dispute, as the Arbitrator characterized it, the Union’s exception does not provide any basis for finding that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority.^[24] Accordingly, we deny this exception. 

 

 

The Union claims that the Arbitrator’s failure to “analyze ‘just cause’ in any way,” establishes that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement, “which requires . . . ‘just cause’ for even a [three]-day suspension.”^[25] In further support, the Union argues that the Arbitrator erred by failing to find various facts that allegedly demonstrate that there was no just cause for the grievant’s suspension. The Union also faults the Arbitrator for failing to mention the Douglas factors.^[26]

 

When reviewing an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Authority applies the deferential standard of review that federal courts use in reviewing arbitration awards in the private sector. ^[27] The Authority and the courts defer to arbitrators in this context “because it is the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement for which the parties have bargained.”^[28] Under this standard, the Authority will find that an arbitration award is deficient as failing to draw its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement when the appealing party establishes that the award: (1) cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purposes of the collective-bargaining agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (3) does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or (4) evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement.^[29] Applying these standards to the instant case, the Union does not establish that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement. 

 

Regarding the Union’s claim that the Arbitrator failed to “analyze ‘just cause’ in any way,”^[30] the record is unclear as to whether the Union specifically argued before the Arbitrator that the grievant’s suspension lacked “just cause” under the parties’ agreement. But assuming, without deciding, that the Union raised a contractual just-cause issue before the Arbitrator, the Union’s essence exception still fails to demonstrate that the award is deficient. 

 

Read in context, the award is reasonably interpreted as including findings responsive to and consistent with the just-cause contract provision of Article 39 of the parties’ agreement, which the Union cites, and which is quoted in relevant part below. The Arbitrator noted specifically the Union’s argument “that the imposition of a [three-]day penalty was inappropriate.”^[31] The Arbitrator’s consideration of the Union’s “appropriateness” issue is consistent with the just-cause contract provision’s requirement that “suspensions . . . will be taken only for appropriate cause.”^[32] Therefore, contrary to the Union’s claim, the award’s failure to mention the term “just cause” does not demonstrate that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement. 

 

Also unavailing is the Union’s additional essence claim that the Arbitrator erred by failing to find various facts that allegedly demonstrate that there was no just cause for the grievant’s suspension. The Union argues, in particular, that the Arbitrator erroneously failed to find that “other employees who engage[d] in the same infractions [as the grievant were] not disciplined in the same manner.”^[33] 

 

To the extent that the Union is disagreeing with the Arbitrator’s factual findings, such disagreement does not demonstrate that an award fails to draw its essence from the agreement.^[34] Therefore, this essence claim also does not demonstrate that the award is deficient.   

 

just-cause contract provision does not require an arbitrator to apply the Douglas factors.^[35] Therefore, this essence claim also does not demonstrate that the award is deficient.

 

 

 

 

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