[ v24 p320 ]
24:0320(37)CO
The decision of the Authority follows:
24 FLRA No. 37
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Respondent
and
HENRY M. THOMPSON, AN INDIVIDUAL
Charging Party
Case No. 4-CO-20019
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
to the attached Decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed by the
General Counsel and cross-exceptions filed by the Respondent. The
Respondent also filed an opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions.
The complaint alleged that the Respondent, the National Federation of
Federal Employees, Washington, D.C. (NFFE National), breached its duty
of fair representation under section 7114(a)(1) of the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and thereby violated
section 7116(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute when it failed to represent
the Charging Party, Henry M. Thompson, in a proceeding conducted by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
We conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that the Respondent did
not violate section 7116(b)(1) and (8) and therefore did not commit an
unfair labor practice.
II. Facts
Thompson was employed by the U.S. Coast Guard in Miami Beach, Florida
in the collective bargaining unit represented by Local 1485 of the
National Federation of Federal Employees, an affiliate of NFFE National.
Following Thompson's removal from employment on September 11, 1981, he
wrote to NFFE National and requested representation at his MSPB appeals
hearing on his discharge. NFFE National replied that its policy was not
to provide such representation from the National Office level, but that
it would in his case ask his Local Union (Local 1485) and a National
Representative located in Florida to provide him assistance.
On October 4, 1981, Thompson received an order from MSPB setting his
hearing for November 24. Through Local 1485, Thompson sought assistance
from National Representative Bob Brown. Brown, who worked out of
Orlando, Florida, met with Thompson in Miami in late October, agreed to
assist him in his MSPB hearing, and told Thompson that he would contact
him the next day. Brown did not contact Thompson, and on November 5
Thompson wrote Brown that the hearing was set for November 24. Brown
was not able to be present at that time and suggested through Local 1485
that Thompson ask for a postponement of his hearing. Thereafter, MSPB
scheduled the hearing for December 16 in Miami. Brown told Thompson
that he would be available for the hearing on that day.
The hearing was later rescheduled by MSPB for Atlanta, Georgia, on
February 24, 1982. Thompson notified Brown of this rescheduled date and
location by phone. During the conversation, Brown told Thompson that
the National Representative in Atlanta was being transferred. Thompson
asked if Brown would be present at his hearing. Brown stated that if he
could not attend the Atlanta hearing, another representative would.
Unable to reach Brown by phone on several occasions in January, Thompson
sent a letter to Brown on February 3, indicating that the MSPB hearing
was set for February 18 in Atlanta and requesting representation by a
qualified union representative. Thompson received no further assistance
nor did he have any further contact with anyone from the Union before
the MSPB hearing, at which Thompson appeared on his own behalf. The
parties stipulated that NFFE National's conduct in this matter was not
motivated by malice.
III. The Judge's Findings
The Judge found that the case presented three issues: (1) may NFFE
National be held responsible for a violation of the duty to fairly
represent an employee when it is not the recognized collective
bargaining agent of the employee involved; (2) if the National has the
duty to represent the employee, does the duty extend to proceedings
before the MSPB; and (3) if the duty exists, what standard of conduct
is to be used to ascertain whether that duty was breached.
As to the first issue, the Judge found that since NFFE National was
not the exclusive representative for the unit in which Thompson was
employed, it had no duty under section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute
notwithstanding the fact that Local 1485 is an affiliate of the
National. Second, the Judge found that, assuming that the National
could be held responsible for the violations alleged in the complaint,
it has no duty to represent employees in MSPB proceedings in any event
and therefore could not have breached any duty to represent Thompson.
The Judge stated that if the National agreed to volunteer, its services
to Thompson, the matter was one of concern strictly between Thompson and
the National and any question of the National's duty in that situation
should not be resolved in this unfair labor practice forum.
Finally, the Judge found that in view of his conclusions as to the
first two issues, he did not have to reach the question of what standard
of conduct a union would be charged with in fulfilling its duty to
represent employees in the collective bargaining unit and whether the
National failed to meet that duty. He went on to state, however, that
such a duty under the Statute exists and, but for his earlier
conclusions, he would find that the National's failure to be present at
the MSPB hearing, after having agreed to represent Thompson and no good
cause having been found which would excuse or explain the National's
failure to appear, would constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct in
violation of the Statute.
In view of his findings and conclusions, the Judge recommended that
the Authority dismiss the complaint.
IV. Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel excepted to the Judge's conclusions as to the
first and second issues and to his conclusion that the National was
blameless in the circumstances of this case. The Respondent, NFFE
National, agreed with the Judge's decision except as to his conclusion
on the third issue that the National's failure to appear at the MSPB
hearing was arbitrary and capricious.
V. Analysis
As to the first issue, we find, contrary to the Judge, that as a
result of its actions in this case NFFE National may be held responsible
for the violations alleged in the complaint. While Local 1485 was the
certified representative of the unit in which Thompson was employed,
NFFE National acted as an agent for Local 1485 throughout the
proceedings in this matter, and therefore was fully responsible for the
duties it assumed on behalf of Local 1485. See, for example, National
Treasury Employees Union and National Treasury Employees Union Chapter
204, 18 FLRA No. 36 (the Authority found that the local chapter acted as
the agent for the exclusive representative, and held that both the local
chapter and the exclusive representative violated section 7114(a)(1) and
thereby violated section 7116 (b)(1) and (8).
With respect to the second issue, we agree with the Judge that the
Respondent had no statutory duty to represent employees in MSPB
proceedings. Although a union has no statutory obligation to represent
employees in MSPB proceedings, it is our view that if a union chooses to
do so, it must do so without discrimination and without regard to union
membership. National Treasury Employees Union and National Treasury
Employees Union Chapter 121, 16 FLRA 717 (1984), enforcement denied,
NTEU v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In this case, the parties
stipulated that Respondent's conduct was not motivated by malice, and
nothing in the record indicates that Respondent's conduct was
discriminatory or was undertaken with regard to union membership.
Finally, as to the third issue, we find that even if Respondent had a
duty to represent Thompson in the MSPB proceeding, Respondent's conduct
did not constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation under
section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute. In National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 1453, 23 FLRA No. 92 (1986), the Authority recently
addressed in detail for the first time the nature of an exclusive
representative's duty of fair representation where union membership is
not a factor. The Authority set forth the following standard:
(W)here union membership is not a factor, the standard for
determining whether an exclusive representative has breached its
duty of fair representation under section 7114(a)(1) is whether
the union deliberately and unjustifiably treated one or more
bargaining unit employees differently from other employees in the
unit. That is, the union's actions must amount to more than mere
negligence or ineptitude, the union must have acted arbitrarily or
in bad faith, and the action must have resulted in disparate or
discriminatory treatment of a bargaining unit employee.
The Authority concluded in NFFE, Local 1453 that under the standard
described the Respondent did not violate section 7114(a)(1) of the
Statute and, therefore, did not violate section 7116(b)(1) and (8) as
alleged in the complaint.
Similarly, we find that the Union's actions in this case do not meet
the standards set forth in NFFE, Local 1453 for finding an unfair labor
practice. While the General Counsel argues that the Union's failure to
appear resulted from "internal Union disorganization" and "lax
administration," the General Counsel has neither alleged nor established
that the Respondent deliberately and unjustifiably treated Thompson
differently from other bargaining unit employees. The record does not
establish that the Respondent acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
Rather, we find that the Union's failure to appear at the MSPB hearing
constituted nothing more than mere negligence or miscommunication.
VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Authority finds that the Respondent did not violate
section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute, and consequently did not violate
section 7116(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute. Therefore, we shall dismiss
the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint in Case No. 4-CO-20019 is dismissed.
Issued, Washington, D.C. December 5, 1986.
Jerry L. calhoun, Chairman
Henry B. Frazier, III, Member
Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
Case No. 4-CO-20019
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Respondent
and
HENRY M. THOMPSON, AN INDIVIDUAL
Charging Party
Catherine Waelder, Esq.
For the Respondent
Linda J. Norwood, Esq.
For the General Counsel
Before: SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION
This case arose under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. Section 7101,
et seq.
Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed by Henry M. Thompson, an
individual, the General Counsel of the Authority, by the Regional
Director for Region IV, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing
alleging that National Federation of Federal Employees, Washington, D.C.
(herein sometimes referred to as Respondent, NFFE or the National)
violated section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute when it failed to
represent Mr. Thompson in a proceeding conducted by the Merit Systems
Protection Board (herein MSPB).
A hearing on the Complaint was conducted at which time Respondent and
the General Counsel were represented by counsel and afforded full
opportunity to adduce evidence, call, examine and cross-examine
witnesses and argue orally. Briefs were filed by counsel and have been
duly considered. /1/
Upon the entire record in this matter, my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor and from my evaluation of the evidence, I
make the following:
Findings of Fact
At all times material herein Local 1485 of the National Federation of
Federal Employees (herein Local 1485) has been the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of various employees of the U.S. Coast Guard
including employees located in Miami Beach, Florida. Local 1485 is
affiliated with the National Federal of Federal Employees, Washington,
D.C. /2/
Henry M. Thompson was employed by the U.S. Coast Guard in Miami
Beach, Florida in the collective bargaining unit represented by Local
1485 for approximately 6 years. /3/ In June 1981 he received from the
Coast Guard a notice of proposed removal. The Coast Guard charged
Thompson with unauthorized absences, falsification of his attendance
record and attempting to deceive, through false written and oral
statements. Thereafter, Thompson, a member of Local 1485 throughout his
employment with the Coast Guard, requested Local 1485 President Evan
Miller to accompany him when Thompson made his oral reply to the prposed
action before the agency. Thompson and Evans appeared for the oral
reply and during the meeting Miller made representations on Thompson's
behalf. However, the charges were upheld by the 7th Coast Guard
District Commander and on September 4, 1981, Thompson was removed from
employment.
On September 11, 1981, Thompson wrote to James M. Peirce, President
of the National Union, related the background of his discharge and
requested that NFFE represent him at his MSPB appeals hearing on the
discharge. Thompson asked that a NFFE lawyer or qualified person
familiar with removal appeals be supplied for this purpose. By letter
dated September 22, President Peirce responded to Thompson and informed
him that assistance would be provided by the National. The letter
stated, in relevant part:
"Ordinarily, all requests for assistance should be communicated
through the Local President in writing. Since this is such a
short time frame here, however, we will not require the strict
adherence to this policy. The NFFE Executive Council has
implemented criteria for making the determination when someone
from the National Office will personally handle a pending matter.
This policy is necessary due to our very limited resources and the
size of the workload routinely received at the National Office
regarding matters other than representation which affect our
Locals nationwide.
"Your appeal is indeed important to us. However, it does not
fall within the criteria outlined by the Executive Council to
warrant National Office personnel exclusively handling the appeal,
as it does not affect your Local nor NFFE as a whole. This does
not in any way mean that we will not be involved.
"I recommend that both you and your Local President speak with
the NFFE National Representative who services your Local. His
name is Bob Brown and he is quite knowledgeable in handling cases
of this type. We will notify Mr. Brown that your case will be
pending and that his advice and expertise should be made available
to you.
"Staff Attorney Edwin Harvey has spoken with Local President
Evans Miller regarding your situation. He has advised Evans that
you should submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
to preserve your right to appeal the separation action since you
possess all the information which is necessary to do so and since
you indicated to Evans your intent to file the appeal. Should you
require advice relating to the appeal prior to your being
contacted by Mr. Brown, please talk with Mr. Miller and have him
contact us at his earliest opportunity."
On October 4, 1981, Thompson received an order from the MSPB which
indicated that his hearing was set for November 24. Thompson thereupon
related this information to Local 1485 President Miller and Miller
called National Representative, Bob Brown /4/ and informed him that
while Thompson was not interested in having the Local Union represent
him before the MSPB, he wished to meet with Brown. Brown was scheduled
to be in the Miami area in late October and agreed to meet with Thompson
at that time. Miller related the message to Thompson.
Thompson met with Brown on October 29 or 30, 1981, in a Miami motel.
/5/ During the approximately 45 minute meeting, Thompson explained the
background of his situation to Brown and produced various documents
related to his case and asked Brown to help him. /6/ Brown reviewed the
matter with Thompson and indicated that he had experience in handling
this type of case and agreed to assist Thompson in his hearing before
the MSPB. /7/ Brown told Thompson he would contact him on the following
day and meet to discuss the case further.
Brown did not contact Thompson and on November 5, 1981, Thompson
wrote to Brown. His letter, a copy of which was sent to Miller, stated:
"The appeal hearing on my removal is set for November 24, 1981,
at 9 A.M. I request that I be represented at this hearing by a
Union attorney or a qualified and competent Union representative
that is knowledgeable about the rules, regulations and procedures
concerning a removal appeal hearing. A place has not been set for
this hearing as yet. Please reply as soon as possible as time is
of the essence."
Thereafter, Thompson heard from Miller and was told that Brown was
not able to be present at the November 24 MSPB hearing and Brown had
suggested that Thompson ask the MSPB for a postponement of the hearing.
Thompson contacted MSPB on November 10 and requested a ten-day
postponement. Subsequently the Coast Guard also sought a postponement
and by Order dated December 4, 1981, the MSPB set the matter to be heard
on December 16 in Miami, Florida. Thompson called Brown and informed
him of the December 16 hearing date and Brown replied that he would be
available for the hearing on that day.
Sometime before December 16, 1981, Thompson received notification
from MSPB that the December 16 hearing date would be cancelled due to
lack of funds. In late December or early January 1982, Thompson
received word from MSPB that his hearing would be held in Atlanta,
Georgia on February 24, 1982. Thompson called Brown and notified him of
the new date and that the MSPB ordered the hearing for Atlanta. /8/
During the conversation Brown told Thompson that the Atlanta
representative was being transferred to a better position in California.
Thompson voiced concern as to how that might affect his case and asked
if Brown would be present at his hearing. Brown replied that if he
could not be there, another representative would. Thompson asked if the
other person would be a qualified representative. Brown responded:
"Certainly."
According to Thompson, during the month of January he attempted to
reach Brown by telephone approximately five times but Brown's telephone
went unanswered. In early February 1982, Miller called Thompson with
regard to Thompson paying his Union dues. During the conversation
Thompson indicated that he was having difficulties contacting Brown.
Miller suggested Thompson contact Brown by mail. On February 3,
Thompson sent Brown a letter by certified mail which indicated that his
MSPB hearing set for February 18, 1982 at 8:30 a.m. in the MSPB hearing
room in Atlanta, Georgia. As he did in his prior letter of November 4,
1981, supra, Thompson requested that he " . . . be represented . . . by
a Union attorney or qualified and competent Union representative that is
knowledgeable about the rules, regulations and procedures at a removal
appeal hearing." Thompson again sought a reply "as soon as possible"
noting time was of the essence.
Brown received the letter on February 5, 1982, or shortly thereafter.
However, according to Brown, whose testimony on this matter I do not
credit, he had a telephone conversation with Thompson on February 4,
1982, and at that time indicated that a Union representative in Atlanta
was on "standby" and, if she had no other hearing or election
commitments, she would meet with Thompson prior to the hearing.
Thompson was to let Brown know where he would be staying and Brown would
contact the Atlanta representative as to where she should contact
Thompson. However, according to Brown, Thompson never again contacted
him and, in any event, unknown to Brown, the Atlanta representative was
transferred to California before February 18.
Thompson received no further assitance nor did he have any contact
with anyone from the Union prior to his MSPB hearing in Atlanta on
February 18, 1982, at which he appeared on his own behalf. /9/ By
decision of April 26, 1982, and final order of March 22, 1983, the MSPB
affirmed Thompson's removal action.
Discussions and Conclusions
Essentially three issues are presented in this case: (1) May the
National Union be held responsible for a violation of the duty to fairly
represent an employee when it is not the recognized collective
bargaining agent of the employee involved; (2) If the National has the
duty to represent the employee, does the duty extend to proceedings
before the MSPB and; (3) If the duty exists, what standard of conduct
is to be used to ascertain whether that duty was breached.
The National Union as Respondent
Section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute provides:
"A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive
recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in
the unit it represents and is entitled to act for, and negotiate
collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the
unit. An exclusive representative is responsible for representing
the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without
discrimination and without regard to labor organization
membership."
It is clear from the language of section 7114(a) (1) that the Statute
grants exclusive representation rights to the exclusive representative.
In my view it follows, therefore, that it is only at the level of
exclusive representation that the right to represent employees exists.
Cf. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration, 6 FLRA 202 (1981), at 204 where the Authority stated:
". . . the mutual obligation to bargain as articulated in the Statute
exists only at the level of exclusive recognition with respect to
conditions of employment which affect any employees within the unit . .
." (Emphasis added). Section 7114(a)(1) also imposes on the exclusive
representative to duty to represent the interests of employees, but
limits that duty to employees in the collective bargaining unit it
represents. Therefore, where a union is not the exclusive collective
bargaining representative, it has neither the Statutory right to
represent the employees in that unit nor the obligation or duty to
represent those employees. Thus, the duty to represent employees is
co-extensive with a union's right to represent those employees. Cf.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964), where the Supreme Court,
when considering a union's rights and obligations which arose under
Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, stated: "The undoubted
broad authority of the union as exclusive bargaining agent in the
negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining contracted is
accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and
duty of fair representation . . ." (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding that Local 1485 is an affiliate of the National
Union, forwards a portion of members' dues to the National and receives
assistance from a National representative in various matters, Local 1485
is the exclusive bargaining representative for the unit in which
Thompson was employed. The collective bargaining agreement covering
that unit is between Local 1485 and the Coast Guard. It is only Local
1485, and not the National, which has the right to represent employees
in the unit in matters which arise out of the employment relationship by
virtue of its status as the exclusive representative. Similarly, it is
only Local 1485, and not the National, which has a correlative duty to
represent unit employees in such matters.
The National became involved in Thompson's case when it, upon request
by Thompson, volunteered the services of National Representative Brown
to make available his "advice and expertise" and Brown inidcated he
would assist Thompson during the MSPB hearing. However, any Statutory
duty to represent owed to Thompson was owed by Local 1485 and not the
National. By volunteering Brown's services the National may have become
the agent of the Local for the purpose of representing Thompson at the
MSPB hearing, but this did not make the National Thompson's Statutory
representative. That right and duty remained with the Local, the
exclusive representative.
Accordingly, since the Complaint herein names only the National as
the Respondent and the National was neither the exclusive representative
nor a party to the collective bargaining agreement, I conclude that the
National was not a proper respondent under the Statue and the Complaint
herein must be dismissed. See Baker et al, v. Newspaper and Graphic
Communications Union, Local 6, et al., 628 F. 2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
The Duty to Represent at MSPB Proceedings
Assuming arguendo that the National Union can be held responsible for
the violations alleged in the Complaint, I would nevertheless conclude
that no breach of any duty to represent Thompson occurred herein. As
stated above, the duty to represent is coextensive with the right to
represent and, in my view, a union has no obligation to represent an
employee in matters wherein the union has no right to represent the
employee. Thus, if a union does not have a specific statutory or
contractual right to pursue a matter, it should not have any statutory
obligation to act. Such an approach would give a balanced meaning to
the Supreme Court's usage of "equal scope" in Humphrey v. Moore, supra,
when it discussed a union's representative responsibility vis a vis its
authority in such matters. Accordingly, where no right to pursue a
matter in a particular forum exists, a union should not be found to have
violated the Statute by its refusal to act, failure to act, or even by
acting discriminatorily or improperly. The situation would simply be
outside the purview of Statutory considerations. /10/
In the case herein the Union has no independent right under the
Statute or by contract to appear before the MSPB to argue or present a
case. /11/ The right to have his removal action brought before the MSPB
was Thompson's and arose separate and apart from the rights granted to
the Union by the Statute or negotiated into the collective bargaining
agreement. /12/ Accordingly, I would conclude that since access to the
MSPB was Thompson's right and Thompson's right alone, the Union cannot
be held to have violated the Statute by its actions or lack thereof in
connection therewith. If the Union agreed to volunteer its services to
Thompson the matter was one of concern strictly between Thompson and the
Union and any question of the Union's duty in that situation should not
be resolved in this forum.
In view of my conclusions herein I need not reach the question of
what standard of conduct a union should be charged with in fulfilling
its duty to represent employees in the collective bargaining unit and
whether the Union herein failed to meet that duty. /13/ However, it
would appear that such a duty under the Statute exists and, but for my
conclusions, supra, I would find that the Union's failure to be present
at the MSPB hearing, after having agreed to represent Thompson and no
good cause having been found which would excuse or explain the Union's
failure to appear at the hearing, would constitute arbitrary and
capricious conduct violative of the Statute.
Nevertheless, I would reject Counsel for the General Counsel's
request that, as part of the remedy, the Union should pay Thompson for
expenses he incurred representing himself. Since there is no showing
that Thompson incurred any expenses additional to those incurred in
connection with being present at the hearing, which hearing he would
have attended in any event, I conclude such remedy would be punative and
is therefore impermissible. IBEW v. Foust, 99 U.S. 2121 (1979).
Accordingly, in view of the entire foregoing, I recommend the
Authority issue the following:
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the Complaint in Case No. 4-CO-20019 be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: July 5, 1984
Washington, D.C.
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
(1) Counsel for Respondent's unopposed Motion to Correct Transcript
regarding minor matters is hereby granted.
(2) As an affiliate, a portion of Local 1485 members' dues is
forwarded to the National.
(3) The unit is described in a collective bargaining agreement
between Local 1485 and the Coast Guard which became effective in August
1977.
(4) Brown works out of Orlando, Florida and is employed by the
National Union. His official title is Division Director and he is
responsible for the supervision of three National Representatives in the
Civil Service Regions within his jurisdiction, as well as personally
serving 22 local unions in Florida, including Local 1485 and one local
in Alabama. Brown's duties include giving assistance and aid to local
unions in negotiations and other matters as requested.
(5) Brown called Miller and had him notify Thompson of the time and
place of the meeting.
(6) In this and other testimony herein, where there is a variance in
the testimony, for the most part I have relied on Thompson's testimony
over that of Brown and Miller. I found Thompson's testimony to be
generally more plausible and more specific, direct, consistent and
responsive to the questions asked.
(7) Brown had never appeared at an MSPB hearing but had experience in
other types of hearings.
(8) This conversation is denied by Brown.
(9) The parties stipulated that Repsondent's conduct in this matter
was not motivated by malice.
(10) This approach would comport with that taken by Judge Burton S.
Sternburg in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
3-CO-20003, OALJ-82-131 (September 16, 1982).
(11) To the extent that National Treasury Employees Union, 10 FLRA
519 (1982), might suggest a different conclusion, in that case the
removal actions involving non-union Nuclear Regulatory Employees were
before the agency and not before the MSPB.
(12) Compare American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1778,
AFL-CIO, 10 FLRA 346 (1982), involving workmens' compensation claims,
which subject was encompassed by the parties collective bargaining
agreement and a union official was granted official time for handling
such matters.
(13) Compare American Federation of Government Employees, Local 987,
3 FLRA 715 (1980). For a thorough discussion of a union's "duty of fair
representation", including the evloution of that concept in the private
sector, see the decision of Judge Francis E. Dowd in National Federation
of Federal Employees, Local 1453, 4-CO-20022, OALJ-84-52 (March 23,
1984.)