[ v19 p1141 ]
19:1141(127)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
19 FLRA No. 127
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Respondent
and
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
REGION VIII
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Respondent
and
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
Charging Party
Case No. 9-CA-20232
DECISION AND ORDER
The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
above-entitled proceeding, finding that the United States Customs
Service, Washington, D.C. and the United States Customs Service, Region
VIII, Seattle, Washington (Respondents) had engaged in certain of the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommending that
Respondents be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action. The Judge found that the Respondents had not
engaged in another unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint.
Thereafter, the Charging Party (NTEU) and the Respondents filed
exceptions to the Judge's Decision, and opposition briefs were filed by
the Respondents and the General Counsel.
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. Upon consideration of the
Judge's Decision and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the
Judge's findings, conclusions, and Recommended Order, as modified
herein.
The Judge, among other things, found that there was a violation of
section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute, concluding that there was a
formal discussion and that the requirements of section 7114(a)(2)(A)
were not met notwithstanding the fact that a union representative was
present at the meeting. Subsequent to the Judge's Decision, the
Authority issued Veterans Administration, Veterans Administration
Medical Center, Muskogee, Oklahoma, 19 FLRA No. 122 (1985), wherein the
Authority held that the actual presence of a union representative at a
"formal discussion" satisfies the requirement of section 7114(a)(2)(A)
that the exclusive representative be given the opportunity to be
represented at such a discussion. Accordingly, without passing upon
whether the meeting at issue was, in fact, "formal" within the meaning
of section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, the Authority hereby reverses
the Judge's conclusion that the Respondents violated section 7116(a)(1)
and (8) of the Statute.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 9-CA-20232 be, and it
hereby is, dismissed.
Issued, Washington, D.C., August 30, 1985
Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
Chairman
William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
Case No.: 9-CA-20232
Patricia K. Olson, Esquire
For the Respondent
Lucinda Bendat, Esquire
For the Charging Party
Stefanie Arthur, Esquire
For the General Counsel, FLRA
Before: GARVIN LEE OLIVER
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION
Statement of the Case
This decision concerns an unfair labor practice complaint issued by
the Regional Director, Region Nine, Federal Labor Relations Authority,
San Francisco, California against the United States Customs Service,
Washington, D.C. and United States Customs Service, Region VIII,
Seattle, Washington, (Respondents), based on charges filed by the
National Treasury Employees Union (Charging Party or Union). The
complaint alleged that Respondents violated sections 7116(a)(1), (5) and
(8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C.
7101 et seq. (the Statute). The complaint charged, in substance, that
Respondents interfered with an employee's right to file a grievance when
Chief Inspector Barney Martin conducted a meeting with bargaining unit
employee Walter Lisowski during which Martin expressed his anger that
Lisowski had filed a grievance and repeatedly told Lisowski to
reconsider pursuing the grievance. The complaint also alleged that the
Martin-Lisowski meeting constituted a formal discussion within the
meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A), and that Respondents' failure to
provide the Union with advance notice of the meeting violated the
Statute.
Respondent's answer denied any violation of the Statute. Respondents
asserted that the meeting concerned an agreement made by Lisowski and
the Union and did not concern the substance or resolution of any
grievance; that the Union was afforded an opportunity to be
represented, and in fact was represented, at the meeting; that
supervisor Barney Martin's comments at the meeting were limited to
reminding Lisowski of an agreement he had made and requesting Lisowski
to reconsider his actions in light of the agreement; that the comments
made by Martin did not contain any threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit, nor were they made under coercive conditions; and
that the meeting was consistent with the requirement of an effective and
efficient Government.
A hearing was held in this matter at Seattle, Washington. The
Respondents, Charging Party, and the General Counsel were represented by
counsel and afforded full opportunity to be heard, adduce relevant
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and file post-hearing
briefs. The Respondents and General Counsel filed briefs, and the
proposed findings have been adopted to the extent found supported by the
record as a whole. Based on the entire record, including my observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations.
Findings of Fact
At all times material herein, the Union has been certified as the
exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of employees of
Respondent U.S. Customs Service, Washington, D.C., including employees
at Respondent U.S. Customs Service, Region VIII, Seattle (Region VIII).
At all times material herein, Bernard Martin has been the Chief,
Inspection Branch, Port of Seattle, Seattle District, and an agent of
Respondent.
By letter dated January 4, 1982, Walter Lisowski, a Customs inspector
at SEATAC airport, Seattle district, Region VIII, was informed of a
proposal to suspend him for thirty days predicated upon two alleged
charges: unofficial use of a government vehicle in violation of 31
U.S.C. 638 and violation of airport security regulations. 31 U.S.C. 638
provides that any officer or employee of the government who willfully
uses a government vehicle for other than official purposes shall be
suspended from duty for not less than one month. The Union represented
Lisowski in responding to the proposed suspension and in negotiating a
settlement.
During the course of the negotiations concerning the disciplinary
proceedings, Lisowski voluntarily admitted to the facts set forth in the
notice of the proposed suspension. At one point in the negotiations,
the Union proposed a settlement involving a suspension of only three
days. However, this was rejected by Acting District Director Raymond
Mintz as not being a satisfactory penalty.
Management recognized that the mandatory one month suspension would
be rather harsh under the circumstances and that a lesser period would
be more appropriate. However, Customs' management was faced with the
problem of deviating from a statutory mandate if a lesser penalty were
imposed. Therefore, a settlement was negotiated which involved an
agreement by Lisowski and the Union that they would not use the case as
a precedent in future cases and would not grieve the action, provided
the discipline were reduced to a five day suspension.
The terms of the settlement were finalized at a meeting between
Inspector Lisowski, Union Chapter President Thomas Geary, and Acting
District Director Mintz on February 26, 1982. This included a
discussion as to the effective dates of the suspension. Union president
Geary and Mr. Lisowski asked that the suspension be made effective March
6-10 (Saturday through Wednesday) which would straddle two pay periods
and minimize the impact of Lisowski's pay loss. Mintz agreed to make
the suspension effective in such a way that Lisowski would lose only
four days of pay (Saturday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday), Sunday being
Lisowski's day off. During the February 26 meeting, Lisowski and Geary
signed a document which provided as follows:
In the event that the proposed suspension of Mr. Walter T.
Lisowski, Customs Inspector, initiated by letter dated January 4,
1982, is reduced from thirty (30) to five (5) days, NTEU will not
grieve the decision nor invoke arbitration; nor will this case be
raised as a precedent issued in any future cases.
As a result of the meeting and agreement, Mintz issued a letter
dismissing the allegation of misuse of a government vehicle and reducing
the suspension to five days. The dates of the suspension were set
during the period of March 6-10 in order that Lisowski's loss of pay
would be spread over two pay periods.
One week prior to the meeting with Mintz, Lisowski had exchanged his
day off during the week of March 7 with Inspector Doctulero. He had
been scheduled to be off on Friday of that week, but had, at Doctulero's
request, exchanged his Friday off for her Tuesday off. The exchange of
days off, or "trade day," had been made through proper channels, in
writing, and approved. After the meeting with Mintz and the final
decision rendered on the dates of his suspension, Lisowski advised his
supervisor of the decision and claimed that, in view of the approved
trade, he should only be charged with three days of lost pay during that
period instead of the four days to be charged under the decision.
Thereupon, the supervisor rescinded the trade day, because it did not
fall within the period of the suspension ordered by the Acting District
Director.
On March 22, 1982 Lisowski and the Union filed a grievance. The
"specific nature of the employment condition in dispute" was stated to
be the "District Director's letter of suspension." The "statement of the
circumstances giving rise to the grievance" recited the facts relating
to the trade day and that this day fell during the time of the
suspension. The "remedy requested" was "that the original trade be
approved and that I be reimbursed for one day's pay during suspension
period." The grievance was filed with Lisowski's immediate supervisor,
Charles Day.
On March 23, when the above grievance came to the attention of Chief
Inspector Martin, Lisowski's second-level supervisor, Martin became
concerned that Lisowski, by the grievance, was reneging on the terms of
the settlement agreement, which, in Martin's view, included an agreement
not to grieve the actual loss of four days pay. Martin was also
concerned that Lisowski had mislead the District Director, at the
February 26 meeting, as to his days off. Martin decided to talk to
Lisowski about these concerns. After being advised by labor relations
personnel that his plan to talk to Lisowski was appropriate, Martin
contacted Lisowski's supervisor and requested that he have Lisowski come
to Martin's office.
Lisowski was approached by supervisor Day while he was working at the
counter at SEATAC airport. Day instructed Lisowski that he was to meet
that afternoon with Chief Inspector Martin in his office downtown in the
Federal office building. He said that Martin was very upset.
Lisowski contacted Union steward Mike Milne and asked him to go
downtown with him as his Union representative. No one in management
contacted Milne, who was the designated steward at the airport, to
advise him of the meeting with Martin.
The meeting commenced at approximately 2:00 p.m. in the office of the
Director of Inspection and Control. Present were Chief Inspector
Martin, Union representative Milne, and Inspector Lisowski. Martin
began the meeting by stating that he was "upset and dissatisfied that
Lisowski had filed a grievance of this nature." When Milne asked at
which step of the grievance procedure the meeting was being held, Martin
stated that they were not meeting at any step in the grievance
procedure; that he was "conducting an informal discussion to let Walt
think about the consequences of filing this grievance."
Martin stated that he was concerned about the fact that Lisowski had
sat in on the negotiations with Mr. Mintz while knowing all the time
about the day off problem. He implied that Lisowski had purposely
deceived Mintz during the suspension discussions by failing to tell him
what his correct days off were. He went on to say that it upset him,
and he couldn't understand why Lisowski would file such a grievance
after having agreed to the suspension. Martin stated that he had spoken
with Mr. Mintz, and the whole principle of the suspension was that
Lisowski would have four days off without pay. Lisowski replied that
the number of days off without pay had not been discussed. Martin asked
Lisowski whether he had read the law on misuse of government vehicles.
He told Lisowski that he had read the law, and that Lisowski was "damn
lucky" that he had not received "30 days plus." Martin reiterated that
he was "quite beside himself," "dumbfounded and amazed" that Lisowski
would file a grievance after the fact.
Martin asserted that Mintz had bent over backwards to accommodate
Lisowski, even permitting the suspension to fall during two separate pay
periods to ease the financial impact. When Lisowski replied that, in
fact, the money had not been taken out of two paychecks as agreed,
Martin picked up the telephone and called Lisowski's supervisor, Charles
Day, at SEATAC. Martin asked Day if the timekeeper had the suspension
period correct on the time cards. Upon receiving an answer, Martin hung
up the phone and exclaimed "Bull," implying that Lisowski was wrong
about the time cards. Milne then advised Martin that he had personal
knowledge that the timekeeper had not been notified since he and the
timekeeper had discussed the suspension period.
Martin concluded the meeting by stating that he did not know if the
grievance had been filed in a timely manner; that if it were, he would
assign it a number and proceed, but that he wanted Lisowski to think
very carefully about the consequences of filing the grievance; to "take
a reading" of the situation and reconsider just how badly he wanted to
file the grievance. Martin told Lisowski that if he did continue to
pursue the grievance, he, Martin, would "fight (him) all the way on it."
Martin was tense, visibly upset, loud, and angry during the meeting.
The meeting lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Following the March 23 discussion, Lisowski and the Union pursued the
grievance through the three steps of the negotiated grievance procedure,
and the Union has invoked arbitration.
Discussion and Conclusions
Alleged Interference With Grievance
The right to file and process grievances under a contractual
grievance procedure falls within the ambit of section 7102 of the
Statute which provides that employees have "the right to form, join, or
assist any labor organization . . . freely and without fear of penalty
or reprisal." Whether the grievance has merit, or is grievable under the
negotiated procedure, is beside the point. An employee has the absolute
right of free access to the grievance procedure to present his
contention. United States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, Chicago, Illinois, 3 FLRA No. 116 (1980). It is
an unfair labor practice under section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute for an
agency "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the
exercise by the employee" of his right to file and process a grievance.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 7 FLRA No. 129
(1982); United States Department of the Treasury, Supra.
The standard by which one may determine interference, restraint, or
coercion is not the subjective perceptions of the employee, nor is it
the intent of the employer. Rather, the test is whether, under the
circumstances of the case, the employer's conduct may reasonably tend to
coerce or intimidate the employee, or, in the case of a statement,
whether the employee could reasonably have drawn a coercive inference
from the statement. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 9 FLRA
No. 31 (1982); Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Ft. Carson,
Colorado, 9 FLRA No. 69 (1982); Department of the Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service, Louisville District, 11 FLRA No. 64 (1983).
It is concluded from all the circumstances that a reasonable employee
would interpret Chief Inspector Martin's statements at the meeting as
statements of agency management and not merely expressions of his own
personal views, as Respondents contend. Lisowski was called away from
his work place at the airport and ordered to appear for a meeting in the
downtown office of his second-line supervisor, Chief Inspector Martin.
Martin was clearly speaking in his supervisory capacity. In fact, he
had received prior authorization to speak to Lisowski about the matter.
Compare Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Ft. Carson,
Colorado, supra.
The essence of Martin's remarks was that Lisowski's grievance,
requesting that he be reimbursed for one day's pay during a suspension
period, violated an agreement that the employee and Union had made in
settlement of a disciplinary suspension; that Lisowski, during the
settlement negotiations, had mislead the Acting District Director as to
his days off during the week of the agreed suspension; that he should
reconsider pursuing the grievance; and that, if he did pursue the
grievance, Martin would fight him all the way on it.
The case of Consumer Product Safety Commission, 10 FLRA No. 72 (1982)
is directly in point. That case, like the present one, involved the
negotiated settlement of a discipline matter and subsequent alleged
interference with statutory rights. In Consumer Product, one of the
terms of the settlement was an agreement by the employee not to
institute any administrative actions, including unfair labor practice
charges, concerning the incidents in question. Some time after the
agreement was made and the employer had implemented its portion, the
employee, among other things, filed an unfair labor practice charge over
the incident. A management official of the employer subsequently sent a
memorandum to the employee stating that the employee had violated the
terms of the agreement, that he expected the employee to withdraw the
unfair labor practice charge, and that, if the employee failed to do so,
the employer would take whatever legal steps were necessary to enforce
the agreement. The Administrative Law Judge found that, because the
memorandum sought only to enforce a commitment made by the employee in
settlement of the discipline matter and did not otherwise attempt to
proscribe his utilization of the Act's protective processes as to other
disputes, it was non-coercive in nature and, therefore, the employer had
not violated the Statute. The Authority adopted the Judge's findings
and conclusions. The Authority noted particularly that the memorandum
made "no mention of precluding any challenge to the validity of that
agreement" and sought only to enforce the settlement agreement.
The instant case involves a face-to-face meeting and not a more
impersonal memorandum. However, as in the Consumer Product case,
Martin's remarks were not directed in a broad, non-specific fashion at
the employee's right to engage in protected activities, but only at the
circumstances surrounding a particular settlement agreement. Compare
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Louisville
District, supra. The settlement, in management's view, was that
management would reduce a proposed 30-day suspension to five days with
the understanding that Lisowski would lose only four day's pay and would
not grieve the decision. Whether or not the settlement agreement bars,
or otherwise affects, the grievance is an issue for resolution in the
grievance/arbitration proceeding, and it is not appropriate for
disposition here. However, under all the circumstances, it was at least
reasonable for Martin to conclude that the filing of the grievance was a
repudiation, or attempt at circumvention, of the negotiated agreement,
and, under Consumer Product, it was appropriate for him to bring
management's position to the employee's and the Union's attention.
Martin's closing remarks, that Lisowski should "think very carefully,
about the consequences of filing the grievance, take a reading of the
situation, and reconsider just how badly he wanted to file the
grievance," were obviously designed to have Lisowski consider and agree
to management's view; namely, that in order to honor the agreement he
should withdraw the grievance. Under the circumstances, the remarks
were no different in effect than the memorandum in Consumer Product
which specifically stated that it expected the employee to honor the
agreement by withdrawing the various appeals.
Martin's comment that if Lisowski did pursue the grievance, he would
"fight him all the way on it" simply meant that Respondents would assert
every legal defense and exhaust every appeal. It was also similar to
the remarks in Consumer Product that, if the various requests, appeals,
and unfair labor practice charge were not withdrawn, the employer would
take whatever legal steps are necessary to enforce the Agreement."
The Union's presence at the meeting also served to reduce any
coercive effect of Martin's remarks. The employee's personal Union
representative was present at the meeting and could explain the overall
significance of Martin's remarks. As found infra, this representative
also had the right to represent the Union's position in this formal
discussion of the alleged conflict between the grievance and the prior
settlement agreement.
Under all the circumstances, it is concluded that Respondents'
conduct, through Chief Inspector Martin, did not constitute
interference, restraint, or coercion under section 7116(a)(1) of the
Act, as alleged.
Alleged Formal Discussion
The General Counsel contends that Respondents' failure to have
provided the Union with notice of the formal discussion which Martin
conducted on March 23, concerning Lisowski's grievance, constituted a
failure to comply with the provisions of section 7114(a)(2)(A) /1/ of
the Statute and an unfair labor practice in violation of section
7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. There is no contention that the
Union would have designated a representative other than Mr. Milne had it
received proper advance notice.
Respondents defend on the basis that Martin made it clear that the
meeting was only an informal discussion; there was no discussion of the
substance or resolution of the grievance; and, in any event, the Union
was afforded the opportunity to be represented and, in such
circumstances, there can be no violation of the Statute resulting from
the employer's failure to give notice.
Under all the circumstances, it is concluded that the meeting on
March 23 between Chief Inspector Martin, a representative of the agency,
and employee Lisowski and his Union representative was a formal
discussion within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A). The meeting had
many of the essential indicia of formality set out by the Authority in
Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration,
Bureau of Field Operations, San Francisco, California, 10 FLRA No. 24
(1982). The meeting was conducted by Chief Inspector Martin, Lisowski's
second line supervisor; it was held in Martin's office at the Federal
office building in downtown Seattle, away from Lisowski workplace at
SEATAC airport; and Lisowski's attendance was mandatory. The meeting
definitely "concerned" the grievance which Lisowski had filed the
previous day. The substance of the discussion essentially involved the
alleged conflict between the grievance and the previous settlement
agreement.
The record reflects that Respondents did not notify the Union of the
formal discussion. However, an appropriate Union representative, Mr.
Milne, was notified and brought to the meeting by the employee as the
employee's representative and was permitted by management to attend,
apparently without question. Respondent contends that the Union was,
therefore, "given the opportunity to be represented" at the meeting
pursuant to section 7114(a)(2)(A), and that there can be no violation of
the Statute resulting from the employer's failure to give specific
advance notice under U.S. Air Force v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 681 F.2d 466 (6th Cir., 1982).
The Authority has held that the fact that a union steward is informed
by an employee of a formal discussion concerning a grievance, and
attends the meeting as a union's representative, does not fulfill the
obligation of the agency to afford the exclusive representative the
opportunity to be represented. Internal Revenue Service, Fresno Service
Center, Fresno, California, 7 FLRA No. 54 (1981). Moreover, the facts
in U.S. Air Force v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, supra, relied
upon by Respondents, are quite different. That case did not involve a
violation of section 7114(a)(2)(A), the formal discussion provision.
The issue involved whether a union had received appropriate advance
notice of planned changes in conditions of employment so that it could
have requested bargaining on such changes. A union steward had attended
a general staff meeting at which an intention to reorganize the office
had been announced, but he had not received any notice of the
reorganization as a union representative. The Authority found a
violation of the agency's obligation to consult in good faith, as
required by sections 7116(a)(1) and (5). The court of appeals denied
enforcement, stating, in part, "We fail to see how Price, in his role as
a human being, could not receive actual notice as an employee and formal
notice as a union steward by his singular attendance at the
reorganization meeting." Therefore, the union had notice, could have
requested bargaining, and there was no violation. In the instant case,
the meeting at issue was not designed to constitute some form of notice
to the Union of a bargaining opportunity. The issue is not whether the
Union received notice at the meeting, but whether it received notice of
the meeting. The whole purpose of the formal discussion provision is to
provide the Union an opportunity to be represented at a formal
discussion. It was a fortuity that the Union representative was asked
to attend the meeting by the employee as the employee's representative.
While, under the principle of the U.S. Air Force decision, the union
then had the opportunity to participate in the meeting by the presence
of an appropriate representative, still Respondents had made no effort
to give the Union appropriate notice in order that it might fulfill the
role contemplated by section 7114(a)(2)(A). Therefore, I conclude that
Respondents did violate sections 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute, /2/
as alleged, and that a cease and desist order would effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Statute.
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is recommended
that the Authority issue the following Order:
ORDER
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority and section 7118 of the Statute, the
Authority hereby orders that the United States Customs Service,
Washington, D.C. and United States Customs Service, Region VII, Seattle,
Washington shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing to give the National Treasury Employees Union
appropriate prior notification of, and opportunity to be
represented at, a formal discussion between one or more
representatives of the agency and one or more employees in the
unit or their representatives concerning a grievance.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Statute.
(a) Give the National Treasury Employees Union appropriate
prior notification of, and opportunity to be represented at, a
formal discussion between one or more representatives of the
agency and one or more employees in the unit or their
representatives concerning a grievance.
(b) Post at its facilities in Seattle, Washington copies of the
attached Notice marked "Appendix" on forms to be furnished by the
Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by
the District Director and shall be posted and maintained by him
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. The District Director shall
take reasonable steps to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Pursuant to 5 C.F.R.section 2423.30 notify the Regional
Director, Region Nine, Federal Labor Relations Authority, San
Francisco, California, in writing, within 30 days from the date of
this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
GARVIN LEE OLIVER
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: March 11, 1983
Washington, D.C.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
RELATIONS
AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
OF TITLE
5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS
STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT fail to give National Treasury Employees Union appropriate
prior notification of, and opportunity to be represented at, a formal
discussion between one or more representatives of the agency and one or
more employees in the unit or their representatives concerning a
grievance. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights assured by the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL give
National Treasury Employees Union appropriate prior notification of, and
opportunity to be represented at, a formal discussion between one or
more representatives of the agency and one or more employees in the unit
or their representatives concerning a grievance.
(Agency or Activity)
Dated: . . . By: (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60
consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced or covered by any other material. If employees have any
questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region Nine, whose address is:
530 Bush Street, Room 542, San Francisco, California, 94108 and whose
telephone number is: (415) 556-8106.
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
/1/ Sec. 7114. Representation rights and duties
(a)(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an
agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at--
. . . .
(A) any formal discussion between one or more representatives
of the agency and one or more employees in the unit or their
representatives concerning any grievance or any personnel policy
or practice or other general condition of employment(.)
/2/ Based on the above outcome, which fully remedies the violation
found, it is unnecessary to decide whether such conduct also violated
section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute. Office of Program Operations, Field
Operations, Social Security Administration, San Francisco Region, 10
FLRA No. 36 (1982).