10:0436(73)AR - HHS, SSA, Louisville, Kentucky District and NFFE Local 1790 -- 1982 FLRAdec AR
[ v10 p436 ]
10:0436(73)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
10 FLRA No. 73 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY DISTRICT Activity and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1790 Union Case No. O-AR-347 DECISION This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of Arbitrator Rankin M. Gibson filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Union filed an opposition. This matter concerned the reprimand of the grievant for certain "unprofessional behavior." A grievance was filed protesting the reprimand and the grievance was ultimately submitted to arbitration. The Arbitrator stated the issue to be whether the Activity had just cause to reprimand the grievant for her conduct. In discussing the source of the reprimand, the Arbitrator noted that the charge of unprofessional behavior derived from the provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement which provides: Employees and Management shall conduct all relationships with courtesy and professionalism. However, the Arbitrator stated that it was uncertain what the parties intended by the term "professionalism." The Arbitrator understood the term to involve characteristics of a profession, in particular the learned professions of law, theology, and medicine. The Arbitrator noted that the Agency apparently employed professional employees, but explained in terms of this case that such employees were expressly excluded from the bargaining unit by the parties' collective bargaining agreement. For these reasons the Arbitrator ruled that under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the grievant, a service representative and a bargaining unit employee, "shall not be reprimanded for 'unprofessional behavior'" and that under the circumstances presented the grievant's lack of courtesy was excused. Accordingly, the Arbitrator determined that the reprimand of the grievant was not for just cause and ordered the reprimand expunged from Activity records. In its exceptions the Agency contends that by reason of the Arbitrator's determination that under the parties' agreement the grievant was not subject to reprimand for unprofessional behavior, the award does not draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement and the Arbitrator exceeded his authority. In support the Agency principally argues that the Arbitrator refused to apply a provision of the parties' agreement to the bargaining unit employees it was negotiated to cover. However, the Agency's exceptions do not provide a basis for finding the award deficient. The exceptions represent an attempt by the Agency to have its own interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement substituted for that of the Arbitrator, and consequently these exceptions constitute nothing more than disagreement with the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of the agreement provision before him. Merely because the Agency or even the Authority may have interpreted the agreement differently than the Arbitrator provides no basis for finding the award deficient. As the Authority stated in United States Army Missile Materiel Readiness Command (USAMIRCOM) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1858, AFL-CIO, 2 FLRA 432 (1980), the question of the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question solely for the arbitrator in that it is the arbitrator's construction of the agreement for which the parties have bargained. In order for an award to be found deficient as failing to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, it must be established that the award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purpose of the collective bargaining agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; or that the award on its face does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or that the award cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement or evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement. Id. at 437-38. This collection of tests, and the private sector cases they are derived from, make it clear that an arbitrator's award cannot be undermined as not drawing its essence from the agreement merely because a party believes that the arbitrator misinterpreted the agreement. In terms of this case, it is clear that the Arbitrator's resolution of the dispute directly resulted from his interpretation of the word "professionalism" as used in the agreement. And while we do not necessarily agree with that interpretation, it cannot with certainty be said that the award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purpose of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the Arbitrator's obligation, or that the award does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement, or that the award cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement or evidences a manifest disregard thereof. Accordingly, no basis is provided for finding that this award is deficient as not drawing its essence from the agreement. Similarly, it has not been established that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority. With no joint stipulation of the issue to be arbitrated, the Arbitrator framed the issue as whether there was just cause to reprimand the grievant for her conduct, and the Arbitrator on the basis of his interpretation of the agreement resolved precisely that issue. Consequently, no basis is provided in this respect for finding the award deficient. See San Antonio Air Force Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1617, 7 FLRA No. 84 (1982); National Border Patrol Council and National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council and United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 3 FLRA 400 (1980). Accordingly, the Agency's exceptions are denied. Issued, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1982 Ronald W. Haughton, Chairman Henry B. Frazier III, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY Leon B. Applewhaite, Member, dissenting: I fully agree with my fellow members that mere disagreement with the interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement does not provide a basis on which an arbitration award will be found deficient under the Statute. However, as has been consistently recognized by the Authority, an arbitrator's award interpreting a collective bargaining agreement is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from that agreement. E.g., Overseas Education Association and Office of Dependents Schools, Department of Defense, 4 FLRA No. 17 (1980). In terms of this case, I disagree with the Authority's determination that the Agency has not established that the Arbitrator's award fails to draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement. As has been noted, the parties in this case expressly provided in their collective bargaining agreement that employees and management officials would conduct all relationships with professionalism. Furthermore, and as was recognized by the Arbitrator, this agreement was negotiated to cover bargaining unit employees, such as the grievant, but did not cover professional employees. As also acknowledged by the Arbitrator, the grievant was reprimanded specifically for unprofessional behavior based on the failure of the grievant to conduct herself with professionalism which in the Activity's view was required by the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the Arbitrator found no just cause for the discipline by expressly rejecting "unprofessional behavior" as a permissible basis on which to reprimand the grievant essentially because, as a service representative and a bargaining unit employee, she was not a professional and therefore could not justifiably be reprimanded for unprofessional behavior. By rejecting in this manner the reprimand of the grievant for unprofessional behavior, the award, in my opinion, fails to draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement by whatever test it is judged. Thus, in my judgment it has been adequately demonstrated that this award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purpose of the parties' agreement so as to manifest an infidelity to the Arbitrator's obligation in resolving this dispute; that this award on its face does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; and that this award evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement and cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Agency has established that the award is deficient as not drawing its essence from the parties' agreement, and accordingly I respectfully dissent from the Authority's decision to deny the Agency's exceptions. Issued, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1982 Leon B. Applewhaite, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY