[ v07 p206 ]
07:0206(32)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
7 FLRA No. 32 COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION Agency and NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CSA LOCALS, AFGE, AFL-CIO Union Case No. O-AR-221 DECISION THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE AUTHORITY ON AN EXCEPTION TO THE AWARD OF ARBITRATOR SEYMOUR STRONGIN FILED BY THE AGENCY UNDER SECTION 7122(A) OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (5 U.S.C. 7122(A)) (THE STATUTE). ACCORDING TO THE ARBITRATOR, THIS DISPUTE CONCERNS THE AGENCY'S SCHEDULING OF A FOUR AND ONE-HALF DAY TRAINING PROGRAM. THE PROGRAM BEGAN AT 9 A.M. ON MONDAY MORNING AND ENDED AT NOON ON FRIDAY. CONSEQUENTLY, EMPLOYEES FROM OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA WERE REQUIRED TO TRAVEL ON SUNDAY IN ORDER TO ATTEND THE OPENING SESSION. THE UNION FILED A GRIEVANCE WHICH WAS ULTIMATELY SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION CLAIMING THAT THE AGENCY'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE SUNDAY TRAVEL TIME AS COMPENSABLE OVERTIME VIOLATED LAW AND THE PARTIES' COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. THE ARBITRATOR REJECTED THE UNION'S CLAIM THAT THE SUNDAY TRAVEL TIME SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPENSABLE TIME. HOWEVER, THE ARBITRATOR DID FIND THAT THE AGENCY VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT BY NOT SCHEDULING THE TRAINING SO AS TO ALLOW EMPLOYEES TO TRAVEL DURING THEIR REGULARLY SCHEDULED WORKWEEK. THUS, THE ARBITRATOR CONCLUDED THAT THE TRAINING SHOULD HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO START ON A TUESDAY AND END ON THE SUBSEQUENT MONDAY. THEREFORE, HE RULED THAT THE EMPLOYEES LOST AN ADDITIONAL TWO DAYS OF PER DIEM PAYMENTS FOR THE SATURDAY AND SUNDAY THAT WOULD HAVE INTERVENED IF THE AGENCY HAD SCHEDULED THE TRAINING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE ARBITRATOR SUSTAINED THE GRIEVANCE AND DIRECTED IN PERTINENT PART: (T)HE PAYMENT TO EACH OF THE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THE GRIEVANCE OF TWO DAYS' PER DIEM AT THE RATE PAYABLE AT THE TIME OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM. THE AGENCY FILED AN EXCEPTION TO THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD UNDER SECTION 7122(A) OF THE STATUTE /1/ AND PART 2425 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS (5 CFR PART 2425). THE UNION FILED AN OPPOSITION. /2/ AS ITS EXCEPTION THE AGENCY CONTENDS THAT THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAW AND REGULATION. THE AGENCY ARGUES THAT SINCE THE EMPLOYEES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT IN A TRAVEL STATUS FOR THE TWO DAYS IN QUESTION THE AWARD OF PER DIEM IS WITHOUT BASIS IN ANY LAW OR REGULATION. THE AUTHORITY AGREES. IN THIS CASE THERE IS NO PROVISION IN ANY RELEVANT STATUTE OR REGULATION THAT PERMITS THE PAYMENT OF THE ORDERED PER DIEM. AS NOTED, THE TRAINING SESSION ENDED AT NOON ON FRIDAY AND THE EMPLOYEES APPARENTLY RETURNED TO THEIR PERMANENT DUTY STATIONS THAT AFTERNOON. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY WERE NOT IN AN OFFICIAL TRAVEL STATUS ON THE SUBSEQUENT SATURDAY AND SUNDAY FOR WHICH THE ARBITRATOR DIRECTED THE PER DIEM BE PAID. IT IS CLEAR UNDER APPLICABLE LAW AND REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED EXPENSES INCURRED BY AN EMPLOYEE FOR SUBSISTENCE WHILE IN AN OFFICIAL TRAVEL STATUS. SEE 5 U.S.C. 5701-5709(1976); FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS (FPMR) 101-7, CHAPTER 1, PART 7 (MAY 1973). THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL HAS HELD THAT THE PURPOSE OF PER DIEM IS TO REIMBURSE A TRAVELER FOR THE ADDITIONAL COSTS OF MEALS AND LODGING WHILE ON TEMPORARY DUTY WHILE STILL MAINTAINING A RESIDENCE AT HIS OR HER PERMANENT DUTY STATION AND THAT WHERE SUCH ADDITIONAL EXPENSES DO NOT OCCUR, THE BASIS FOR THE SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE FAILS AND AN AGENCY MAY NOT PAY PER DIEM. SEE MATTER OF W. PAUL WOODARD, B-185932, MAY 27, 1976. THUS, THERE IS NO BASIS UNDER APPLICABLE LAW AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM FOR THE PER DIEM DIRECTED BY THE ARBITRATOR IN THIS CASE SINCE NO SUBSISTENCE EXPENSES WERE ACTUALLY INCURRED BY THE EMPLOYEES. IT IS NOTED THAT THE ARBITRATOR DETERMINED THAT HAD THE TRAINING BEEN PROPERLY SCHEDULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT THE EMPLOYEES WOULD HAVE BEEN IN AN OFFICIAL TRAVEL STATUS FOR THE TWO DAYS IN QUESTION AND IT WAS ON THIS BASIS AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE BACK PAY ACT OF 1966 /3/ THAT THE ARBITRATOR FASHIONED THE REMEDY DIRECTING THE PAYMENT OF TWO DAYS PER DIEM. HOWEVER, NEITHER THE BACK PAY ACT NOR ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS /4/ AUTHORIZE THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM AS PART OF AN AWARD OF BACKPAY. WHILE IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT THE BACK PAY ACT PROVIDES THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO REMEDY AN UNJUSTIFIED OR UNWARRANTED PERSONNEL ACTION THAT HAS DENIED AN AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE "PAY, ALLOWANCES, OR DIFFERENTIALS" THAT THE EMPLOYEE WOULD HAVE EARNED OR RECEIVED IF THAT ACTION HAD NOT OCCURRED, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LODGE 2201, 4 FLRA NO. 57(1980), THE "PAY, ALLOWANCES, OR DIFFERENTIALS" THAT ARE PROPER COMPONENTS OF AN AWARD OF BACKPAY DO NOT INCLUDE THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM. HURLEY V. UNITED STATES, 624 F.2D 93 (10TH CIR. 1980); MORRIS V. UNITED STATES, 595 F.2D 591 (CT. CL. 1979). /5/ THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM IS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE ACT OR THE REGULATIONS AND PER DIEM IS NOT IN THE NATURE OF THE ALLOWANCES THAT ARE PROPERLY PAYABLE UNDER 5 CFR 550.802(F)(1981). THE "PAY, ALLOWANCES, OR DIFFERENTIALS" ENCOMPASSED BY THE ACT CONSTITUTE "NORMAL LEGITIMATE EMPLOYEE BENEFITS" IN THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OR EMOLUMENTS WHICH DO NOT EMBRACE A REIMBURSEMENT PAYMENT SUCH AS PER DIEM. SEE HURLEY, 624 F.2D AT 94-05. THUS, THE BACK PAY ACT OF 1966 PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD IN THIS CASE. /6/ SEE MORRIS, 595 F.2D AT 594. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS AND PURSUANT TO SECTION 2425.4 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES, THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD IS MODIFIED BY STRIKING ALL DIRECTIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM. AS SO MODIFIED THE AWARD IS SUSTAINED. ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 19, 1981 RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY --------------- FOOTNOTES: --------------- /1/ 5 U.S.C. 7122(A) PROVIDES: (A) EITHER PARTY TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CHAPTER MAY FILE WITH THE AUTHORITY AN EXCEPTION TO ANY ARBITRATOR'S AWARD PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION (OTHER THAN AN AWARD RELATING TO A MATTER DESCRIBED IN SECTION 7121(F) OF THIS TITLE). IF UPON REVIEW THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT THE AWARD IS DEFICIENT-- (1) BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO ANY LAW, RULE, OR REGULATION; OR (2) ON OTHER GROUNDS SIMILAR TO THOSE APPLIED BY FEDERAL COURTS IN PRIVATE SECTOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS; THE AUTHORITY MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION AND MAKE SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE AWARD AS IT CONSIDERS NECESSARY, CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, OR REGULATIONS. /2/ IN ITS OPPOSITION, THE UNION ALSO CONTENDS THAT THE AGENCY'S EXCEPTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT FOR VARIOUS REASONS. HOWEVER, THE AUTHORITY FINDS NO BASIS FOR DETERMINING THAT THE AGENCY'S EXCEPTION IS DEFICIENT ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. /3/ 5 U.S.C. (SEC.) 5596 (1976 & SUPP. III 1979). WHILE THE ARBITRACOR DID NOT CITE THE BACK PAY ACT SPECIFICALLY, HE DID REFER TO NUMEROUS COMPTROLLER GENERAL DECISIONS WHICH STAND FOR THE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT A VIOLATION OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT MAY BE AN UNJUSTIFIED AND UNWARRANTED PERSONNEL ACTION REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF BACKPAY. NONE OF THOSE DECISIONS INVOLVED PAYMENTS OF PER DIEM. /4/ 5 CFR PART 550,SUBPART H (1981). /5/ IN ITS OPPOSITION, THE UNION ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH MORRIS, WHICH APPLIED THE BACK PAY ACT PRIOR TO ITS 1978 AMENDMENTS, ON THE GROUND THAT THE AMENDED LANGUAGE OF THE ACT AUTHORIZES PER DIEM AS A COMPONENT OF BACKPAY. HOWEVER THE AMENDED LANGUAGE OF THE BACK PAY ACT PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR FINDING THAT PER DIEM WAS SPECIFICALLY INTENDED BY CONGRESS TO BE A COMPONENT OF AN AWARD OF BACKPAY IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS THOSE PRESENTED IN THE INSTANT CASE. NOTHING IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING AND IT IS NOTED THAT THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS TO THE ACT AS AMENDED CONTINUE TO PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEM IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. SEE HURLEY V. UNITED STATES, 624 F.2D 93, 95 (10TH CIR. 1980) (DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF THE BACK PAY ACT, AS AMENDED). /6/ THE UNION HAS REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MORE FULLY BRIEF THE ISSUE OF THE BACK PAY ACT. HOWEVER, THE UNION'S POSITION IS ADEQUATELY PRESENTED IN ITS OPPOSITION AND THE AUTHORITY HAS FULLY CONSIDERED THE ISSUE IN MAKING ITS DECISION. ACCORDINGLY, NO FULLER BRIEFING IS NECESSARY AND THE REQUEST IS THEREFORE DENIED.