[ v01 p993 ]
01:0993(112)CO
The decision of the Authority follows:
1 FLRA No. 112 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2126, AFL-CIO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA Respondent and JULIAN J. REIMONENQ Complainant Assistant Secretary Case No. 70-6211(CO) DECISION AND ORDER ON MARCH 29, 1979, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE THOMAS SCHNEIDER ISSUED HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING, FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD NOT ENGAGED IN THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. /1/ THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 304 OF REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 2 OF 1978 (43 F.R. 36040), WHICH TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IS IMPLEMENTED BY SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS (44 F.R. 44741, JULY 30, 1979). THE AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE FUNCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 7135(B) OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1215). THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS AND SECTION 7135(B) OF THE STATUTE, THE AUTHORITY HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE MADE AT THE HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED. THE RULINGS ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE SUBJECT CASE, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION. /2/ ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN ASSISTANT SECRETARY CASE NO. 70-6211(CO) BE, AND IT HEREBY IS, DISMISSED. ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 20, 1979 RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY CURTIS TURNER NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AFGE 620 CONTRA COSTA BOULEVARD SUITE 206 PLEASANT HILL, CALIFORNIA 94523 FOR THE RESPONDENT WILLIAM EZZY PAST PRESIDENT, AFGE LOCAL 2126 315 BALBOA COURT ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA 94501 FOR THE COMPLAINANT BEFORE: THOMAS SCHNEIDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION AND ORDER THIS PROCEEDING WAS INITIATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED; THE NOTICE OF HEARING WAS ISSUED BY A REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; AND THE PROCEEDING WAS CONDUCTED BEFORE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. THIS DECISION, PURSUANT TO TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 44, NO. 1, JANUARY 2, 1979, PAGES 708, IS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE AUTHORITY AND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2400.2 (5 C.F.R. 2400.2) OF THE TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, SHALL BE PROCESSED BY THE AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, TITLE 29, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, PART 201, ET SEQ., EXCEPT THAT THE WORD "AUTHORITY" SHALL BE SUBSTITUTED WHEREVER THE WORDS "ASSISTANT SECRETARY" APPEAR IN THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. JULIAN J. REIMONENQ, ("COMPLAINANT") FILED A COMPLAINT AND AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST LOCAL 2126 OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (THE "UNION") CHARGING THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNION VIOLATED EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED ("THE ORDER"), BY (1) REFUSING TO REPRESENT HIM IN HIS "EEO CASE, COMPLAINT #1," (2) REFUSING TO BE TECHNICAL ADVISOR IN HIS EEO COMPLAINT, AND (3) BY STATING THAT HIS EEO CASE HAS NO MERIT. THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, SAN FRANCISCO REGION, LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, AFTER INVESTIGATING, SET THE MATTER FOR HEARING. SAID HEARING WAS HELD BEFORE ME IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ON NOVEMBER 16, 21 AND 22, 1978. COMPLAINANT WAS REPRESENTED BY MR. WILLIAM EZZY, A PAST PRESIDENT OF THE UNION AND THE UNION WAS REPRESENTED BY MR. CURTIS TURNER, NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. BRIEFS WERE FILED BY BOTH PARTIES, THE LAST ONE BEING RECEIVED ON DECEMBER 11, 1978. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS BACKGROUND AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES THE UNION WAS ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION BY AND HAD ENTERED INTO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH REGION 9, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION ("GSA"). COMPLAINANT WAS A CLERK (GS-4), EMPLOYED BY GSA FOR TEN YEARS, AND A MEMBER OF THE UNION. IT BECAME APPARENT AT THE HEARING THAT THERE WERE SOME PERSONAL DIFFERENCES AT LEAST BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNION, LILA BELL, AND ONE OF THE WITNESSES, A FORMER VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION, ELIZABETH TOR. MANY OF THE OTHER WITNESSES AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE CASE, INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES, WERE ALLIED WITH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. THIS FACTIONALISM CONTRIBUTED TO OBSCURING THE ISSUES UPON WHICH THIS CASE TURNS. FOR EXAMPLE, NO COPY OF A COMPLAINT IN COMPLAINANT'S "EEO CASE, COMPLAINT #1" WAS EVER INTRODUCED AND THERE WAS SOME DISPUTE AS TO WHAT FACTS GAVE RISE TO SAID EEO COMPLAINT. IT APPARENTLY ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX AND RACE (TR. 172). /3/ COMPLAINANT IS MALE AND CONSIDERS HIMSELF LATIN (TR. 171-172). HE FEELS THAT GSA MANAGEMENT, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS SUPERVISORS, ONE OF WHOM, MR. MILLER, IS BLACK, AND ANOTHER ONE OF WHOM, MR. DEA, IS ORIENTAL, WILL BLOCK THE PROGRESS OF MALES WHO ARE NEITHER ORIENTAL OR BLACK. MANAGEMENT'S ACT OF ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION APPARENTLY WAS A LETTER OF INFRACTION COMPLAINANT RECEIVED (R-22) /3/ FOR ALLEGED RUDENESS TO SUPERVISOR DEA ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1977. /4/ THE LETTER OF INFRACTION WAS ONE OF A SERIES OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS WHICH GSA MANAGEMENT TOOK AGAINST COMPLAINANT, ULTIMATELY RESULTING IN HIS TERMINATION IN JUNE OR JULY 1978. COMPLAINANT BELIEVES THAT ALL THE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST HIM WERE SIMPLY PRETEXTS TO GET RID OF HIM. HE HAS FILED A TOTAL OF FOUR EEO COMPLAINTS, ALL OF WHICH WERE STILL PENDING IN AN UNSPECIFIED FORUM AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING. THE UNION'S HANDLING OF THE FIRST OF THESE EEO COMPLAINTS WAS THE FOCUS OF COMPLAINANT'S COMPLAINT AND OF THE HEARING. THERE WAS NO HEARING ON THAT FIRST EEO COMPLAINT UNTIL JULY 19, 1978. ON JANUARY 19, 1978, ELIZABETH TOR RESIGNED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION. ON JANUARY 24 SHE ASKED PRESIDENT BELL BY LETTER WHETHER BELL WOULD STILL ACT AS TECHNICAL ADVISOR IN COMPLAINANT'S EEO CASE. TOR HAD BEEN REPRESENTING COMPLAINANT, BUT WANTED HELP. PRESIDENT BELL REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: "THE UNION HAS REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE CASE INVOLVED AND FEELS THAT IT IS WITHOUT MERIT. WE WOULD NOT PROCEED INTO THE FORMAL HEARING STAGE WITH THE INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION, PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR LETTER DATED JANUARY 24, 1978, NO. I WOULD RECOMMEND YOU FIND ANOTHER PERSON TO ASSIST AS TECHNICAL ADVISOR IF IT IS YOUR DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD INTO THE HEARING." (C-D). /3/ BELL ALSO WROTE TO MANAGEMENT AS FOLLOWS: "THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU THAT MRS. ELIZABETH TOR (BETTY) IS NO LONGER HOLDING OFFICE IN LOCAL 2126. SHE RESIGNED AS VICE PRESIDENT BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 19, 1978. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO EXCEPT (SIC) THE RESIGNATION ON JANUARY 24TH, EFFECTIVE TODAYS DATE. MRS. TOR WILL NOT BE ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE LOCAL IN ANY MATTER UNTIL FURTHER NOTIFICATION, THEREFORE, ANY TIME SHE MAY WISH TO SIGN OUT FOR IN ANY REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES WILL HAVE TO COME UNDER REPRESENTATION AS A GSA EMPLOYEE AND UNDER GSA ORDERS. I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING BETTY TO REPRESENT THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PAST WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, IT HAS BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED BY THE LOCAL. THANK YOU. SINCERELY, (S) LILA BELL LILA BELL, PRESIDENT, AFGE LOCAL 2126" (C-C) COMPLAINANT CONTENDS THAT THESE LETTERS FORM LILA BELL PREVENTED BETTY TOR FROM REPRESENTING, OR CONTINUING TO REPRESENT HIM. HE ALSO CONTENDS THAT BELL HAD NO BASIS FOR SAYING THAT HIS CASE "IS WITHOUT MERIT." HE CONTENDS THAT THE UNION HAS AN OBLIGATION UNDER SECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER TO REPRESENT ALL EMPLOYEES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, AND THEREFORE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO REPRESENT HIM. COMPLAINANT ALSO IMPLIES SOME IMPROPER COLLUSION BETWEEN LILA BELL AND GSA MANAGEMENT AGAINST COMPLAINANT. NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THIS IMPLICATION. THUS, THIS CASE TURNS UPON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE UNION BREACHED ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION. FAIR REPRESENTATION THE UNION CONTENDS THAT IT HAD NO DUTY TO REPRESENT CLAIMANT IN AN EEO COMPLAINT BECAUSE THAT IS A STATUTORY APPEALS PROCEDURE WHICH CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE AGENCY. ALTERNATIVELY, IT CONTENDS THAT IN FACT IT REPRESENTED HIM. IT ALSO CONTENDS THAT ITS INVESTIGATION WAS THOROUGH. LASTLY THE UNION CONTENDS THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS COMPLAINT SINCE EEO MATTERS WERE HEARD UNDER CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PROCEDURES. OF COURSE, I WILL NOT DECIDE THE MERITS OF COMPLAINANT'S EEO COMPLAINTS; THEY ARE BEING LITIGATED ELSEWHERE. I MUST, HOWEVER, ADDRESS THE QUESTION WETHER THE UNION VIOLATED EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491. THE CHARGE HERE IS AGAINST THE UNION. GSA IS NOT A PARTY. THEREFORE I MAY NOT DETERMINE WHETHER MANAGEMENT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ITS ACTIONS AGAINST COMPLAINANT OR WHETHER IT ACTED FROM IMPROPER MOTIVES OF RACE OR SEX DISCRIMINATION. NOTHING IN THIS OPINION IMPLIES ANY OPINION OF THE MERITS OF COMPLAINANT'S EEO COMPLAINTS. THE ISSUE OF FAIR REPRESENTATION BY THE UNION IS ENTIRELY DISTINCT AND SEPARATE. VACA V. SIPES, (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 192-193. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT, UNTIL SHE RESIGNED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION ON JANUARY 19, 1978, ELIZABETH TOR DID, IN FACT, INVESTIGATE COMPLAINANT'S COMPLAINTS; AND REPRESENTED HIM IN HIS DEALINGS WITH EEO COUNSELORS AND INVESTIGATORS. THEREAFTER SHE FELT PRECLUDED FROM DOING SO BECAUSE SHE WAS NEITHER VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION NOR A SHOP STEWARD. BUT, AS THE UNION POINTS OUT, SHE WAS FREE TO DO SO AS AN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE OF GSA. SHE TESTIFIED THAT SHE CONTINUED TO ASSIST THE COMPLAINANT, EVEN AT THE EEO HEARING IN JULY, AT WHICH TIME HE WAS FORMALLY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. IT IS THE LAW THAT THE UNION, AS SUCH, HAD NO DUTY TO REPRESENT COMPLAINANT IN HIS EEO COMPLAINT. FPM LETTER 713-29 (P. 8); EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, SECTION 13(A); P.O. 92-261, SECTION 11, 42 U.S.C. 2000E-16(1976). THUS, THE VICE-PRESIDENT UNDERTOOK ACTIVITY ON COMPLAINANT'S BEHALF BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY. COMPLAINANT DOES NOT SUGGEST OTHERWISE; HIS COMPLAINT IS NOT DIRECTED AT FORMER VICE-PRESIDENT TOR, BUT AT PRESIDENT BELL. I FIND THAT PRESIDENT BELL ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATED COMPLAINANT'S COMPLAINTS. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS NOTE-WORTHY THAT GSA MANAGEMENT TOOK A NUMBER OF ACTIONS AGAINST COMPLAINANT, WHICH HE CONSIDERED "HARASSMENT," AND WHICH HE WANTED REMEDIED. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM THE RECORD MADE BEFORE ME TO PINPOINT EXACTLY WHICH ACTIONS RESULTED IN THE "FIRST EEO COMPLAINT." SUCH GSA MANAGEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDED (AMONG MANY OTHERS REFERRED TO BUT NOT INTRODUCED AS EXHIBITS) A POOR EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE RATING (C-A), AND A CHARGE OF ONE-HOUR AWOL ON MAY 3, 1977, AS A RESULT OF COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY USING A PUBLIC PHONE FOR 1 HOUR AND 40 MINUTES (R-17, R-19), AS WELL AS THE AFOREMENTIONED (SUPRA, P. 3) RECORD OF INFRACTION ALLEGING LOUD AND DISRESPECTFUL CONDUCT ON SEPTEMBER 8 (R-22). BELL'S ACTIVITY ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH COMPLAINANT, AND WITH THE SUPERVISORS INVOLVED. IT IS EVIDENT THAT BELL'S STYLE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE WITH MANAGEMENT. THUS, SHE TRIED TO GET THE AWOL CHANGED TO TIME CHARGED AGAINST ANNUAL LEAVE, AND TO GET MORE TIME FOR COMPLAINANT TO IMPROVE HIS POOR PERFORMANCE RATING, AS WELL AS UPDATING THIS "FORM 171," SO THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO APPLY FOR OTHER POSITIONS. THIS IS HARDLY EVIDENCE OF A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION. SEE, E.G. BREWERY WORKERS (MILLER BREWING CO.), 195 NLRB 772, 79 LRRM 1538(1972). BELL ALSO TESTIFIED THAT COMPLAINANT ADMITTED BEING "A TELEPHONE ECCENTRIC" AND COMING TO WORK LATE BECAUSE HE WAS NOT BEING PAID ENOUGH. COMPLAINANT DENIED THESE ADMISSIONS. I BELIEVE COMPLAINANT TO THE EXTENT THAT HE DID NOT COIN THE PHRASE "TELEPHONE ECCENTRIC" TO MEAN SOMEONE WHO USES THE PHONE FOR UNDULY LONG PERIODS, BUT I BELIEVE BELL'S TESTIMONY IN SUBSTANCE THAT COMPLAINANT ADMITTED USING THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE FOR LONG PERIODS AND COMING TO WORK LATE. IN ADDITION TO THESE ADMISSIONS BY COMPLAINANT, BELL WAS SHOWN INFORMAL LETTERS BY GSA MANAGEMENT TO COMPLAINANT THAT SHOWED THAT GSA MANAGEMENT HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT COMPLAINANT'S ATTITUDE ON MANY OCCASIONS DATING BACK TO 1972, INCLUDING SEVERAL IN 1976. THESE LETTERS CONTRADICTED COMPLAINANT'S ASSERTION THAT HE HAD GOTTEN ALONG FINE WITH SUPERVISORS PRIOR TO MR. DEA. COMPLAINANT CONTENDS THAT THESE WERE UNOFFICIAL LETTERS THAT WERE NOT PART OF HIS PERSONNEL FILE, AND THAT GSA MANAGEMENT ACTED IMPROPERLY IN MAINTAINING THEM. EVEN IF GSA MANAGEMENT ACTED IMPROPERLY IN THIS CONNECTION, THE IMPROPRIETY CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO BELL. SHE BEHAVED REASONABLY IN ACCEPTING THIS EVIDENCE TOGETHER WITH ALL OTHER KNOWLEDGE THAT SHE OBTAINED IN EVALUATING COMPLAINANT'S PROBLEMS WITH GSA MANAGEMENT. FROM THE FOREGOING, AS WELL AS FROM HER LETTER TO TOR OF JANUARY 25, 1978, (C-D) IT IS CLEAR THAT BELL REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT COMPLAINANT HAD NO CHANCE OF WINNING AT A FORMAL HEARING. COMPLAINANT'S WITNESSES TESTIFIED, AND I CREDIT THEIR TESTIMONY DESPITE BELL'S DENIAL, THAT BELL SAID TO MR. MILLER, COMPLAINANT'S SUPERVISOR, THAT COMPLAINANT'S FIRST EEO COMPLAINT "HAD NO MERIT." IF COMPLAINANT AND BELL HAD A CLIENT-ATTORNEY RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNION AND GSA MANAGEMENT HAD A STRICTLY ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP, THIS COMMENT MIGHT BE IMPROPER. BUT THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION THAT A LABOR ORGANIZATION OWES TO ALL UNIT MEMBERS UNDER SECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER, IS NOT THE SAME DUTY AN ATTORNEY OWES HIS CLIENT. SEE, SERVICE EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 579 (BEVERLY MANOR CONVALESCENT CENTER), 229 NLRB 629, 95 LRRM 1156(1977). A LABOR ORGANIZATION HAS NO DUTY TO "BLINDLY REPRESENT THE CAUSES" OF ITS MEMBERS. LOCAL R7-51, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (NAGE) AND CHARLES A. QUILICO, A/SLMR 896, 7 A/SLMR 775, 782(1977). IN REPRESENTING ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, A UNION CANNOT AFFORD TO IMPAIR ITS CREDIBILITY WITH MANAGEMENT BY CHAMPIONING CAUSES IT BELIEVES TO BE FRIVOLOUS. EVEN A LATER DETERMINATION THAT THE CAUSE HAD MERIT WOULD NOT PROVE A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, SO LONG AS THE UNION'S POSITION IS BASED ON GOOD FAITH. VACA V. SIPES, SUPRA (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 191-193. AN ATTORNEY, ON THE OTHER HAND HAS A DUTY TO REPRESENT HIS CLIENT ZEALOUSLY TO THE LIMITS OF THE LAW REGARDLESS OF HIS PERSONAL BELIEF. SEE ABA CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 7 (1978). THUS, BELL'S STATEMENT THAT COMPLAINANT'S CASE HAS NO MERIT WAS PERHAPS UNNECESSARY OR IMPRUDENT, BUT IT DID NOT VIOLATE HER DUTY AS UNION PRESIDENT, NOR THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION. TO ESTABLISH A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, A MEMBER MUST SHOW HE WAS TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER MEMBERS. WHITTEN V. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, 521 F.2D 1335, 90 LRRM 2161 (CA6, 1975). ALTHOUGH THAT CASE AROSE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THERE IS NO REASON FOR POSTULATING A DIFFERENT STANDARD IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT BELL OR THE UNION WOULD HAVE TREATED DIFFERENTLY THE COMPLAINT OF ANY OTHER MEMBER WHO WAS SIMILARLY SITUATED. AFTER TOR RESIGNED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION IN JANUARY 1978, COMPLAINANT ATTEMPTED TO ENLIST THE AID OF NUMEROUS OTHER SHOP STEWARDS IN HIS ULTIMATELY LOSING BATTLE TO RETAIN HIS JOB. SOME, LIKE FRANK MORENO WERE WILLING TO HELP, BUT COMPLAINANT WENT ELSEWHERE. MORENO FELT THAT SOME OF COMPLAINANT'S COMPLAINTS AGAINST GSA MANAGEMENT WERE VALID, BUT THAT HE BROUGHT OTHER PROBLEMS ON HIMSELF. MORENO COULD FIND HARASSMENT BY GSA MANAGEMENT, BUT NO DISCRIMINATION. THIS LESS THAN FULL SUPPORT FORM MORENO COOLED COMPLAINANT ON MORENO. OTHER STEWARDS DECLINED TO HELP COMPLAINANT BECAUSE THEY WERE ADVISED TO KEEP "HANDS OFF" BY PRESIDENT BELL AND NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE TURNER. BELL DENIED THAT SHE EVER SAID "HANDS OFF." I BELIEVE, NEVERTHELESS, THAT SHE DID DISCOURAGE SEVERAL SHOP STEWARDS FROM GETTING INVOLVED IN THEIR CAPACITY AS STEWARDS. HOWEVER, SUCH DISCOURAGEMENT WAS PROPER SINCE THE UNION, AS SUCH, HAS NO DUTY TO REPRESENT AN EMPLOYEE IN AN EEO COMPLAINT. SUPRA, P. 5. FURTHERMORE, BETTY TOR WAS STILL OFFICIALLY REPRESENTING COMPLAINANT SINCE HER DESIGNATION (R-30) HAD NEVER BEEN REVOKED. BELL'S REFUSAL TO BE TECHNICAL ADVISOR I CONCLUDE THAT BELL'S REFUSAL TO BE A TECHNICAL ADVISOR IN COMPLAINANT'S EEO HEARING, WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE ORDER. THE UNION INTRODUCED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, ABSENT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS, IT WAS IMPERMISSIBLE TO HAVE BOTH A TECHNICAL ADVISOR AND A REPRESENTATIVE AT A HEARING. BUT EVEN ASSUMING THAT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD HAVE BEEN MADE, THERE IS NOTHING TO COMPEL BELL IN PARTICULAR TO SERVE AS TECHNICAL ADVISOR AGAINST HER WILL. FURTHER, THE HEARING WAS NOT IMMINENT WHEN BELL DECLINED TO SERVE. IN FACT THE HEARING DID NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL ABOUT SIX MONTHS LATER. CONCLUSION IN SUMMARY, I CONCLUDE THAT THE RESPONDENT UNION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR PERFUNCTORILY OR IN BAD FAITH, AND THUS DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION TO THE COMPLAINANT, UNDER ANY OF THE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THAT DUTY. SEE BARHITTE V. KROGER CO., 99 LRRM 2663 (DC MICH. 1978) FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE CASES. ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 6 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER, 11491, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 203.26(C) OF THE REGULATIONS (29 C.F.R. 203.26(C)) AND THE TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, 5 C.F.R. PART 2400, 44 FED.REG. 7 (JANUARY 2, 1979), THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY HEREBY ORDERS THAT THE COMPLAINT OF JULIAN J. REIMONENQ IS DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. THOMAS SCHNEIDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DATED: MARCH 29, 1979 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA TS:SCM /1/ THE COMPLAINANT FILED EXCEPTIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION AND ORDER WHICH WERE UNTIMELY AND THUS WERE NOT CONSIDERED. /2/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224) THE PRESENT CASE IS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED. THE DECISION AND ORDER DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER. /3/ THE RECORD IS REFERRED TO AS FOLLOWS: R REFERS TO RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS; C REFERS TO COMPLAINANT'S EXHIBITS; TR. REFERS TO PAGES IN THE TRANSCRIPT. /4/ R-22 SPECIFIES SEPTEMBER 9, BUT THE PARTIES AGREE THE EVENT HAPPENED ON SEPTEMBER 8.