[ v01 p832 ]
01:0832(96)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
1 FLRA No. 96 AUGUST 10, 1979 MS. JANICE K. MENDENHALL CONTROLLER-- DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20405 RE: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER, A/SLMR No. 1174, Case No. 0-AS-6 DEAR MS. MENDENHALL: THE AUTHORITY HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR A STAY OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION, AND THE UNION'S OPPOSITION THERETO, IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE. IN THIS CASE, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2928 (THE UNION) FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER (THE ACTIVITY). THE COMPLAINT, AS AMENDED, ALLEGED THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER BY PROHIBITING AN EMPLOYEE FROM ACTING SIMULTANEOUSLY AS AN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) COUNSELOR AND AS A UNION OFFICER. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ADOPTED THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ), WHO CONCLUDED THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER BY PROHIBITING THE EMPLOYEE FROM ACTING SIMULTANEOUSLY AS A PART-TIME EEO COUNSELOR AND AS A UNION OFFICER. /1/ IN REACHING THIS DETERMINATION, THE ALJ REJECTED THE ACTIVITY'S ARGUMENT THAT THE HOLDING OF ANY UNION OFFICE, REGARDLESS OF ITS DUTIES, WOULD IN ITSELF "RESULT IN A CONFLICT OR APPARENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR OTHERWISE BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH . . . THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF" AN EEO COUNSELOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER. IN THIS REGARD, HE STATED: IN MY VIEW THE DUTIES OF THE PARTICULAR (U)NION OFFICE IN QUESTION MUST BE EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY CONFLICT WOULD ARISE UNDER (S)ECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER IF THE OFFICER SIMULTANEOUSLY SERVED AS EEO COUNSELOR. IN (THE INSTANT) CASE, (THE EMPLOYEE'S) DUTIES AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY-TREASURER-RECORDED INVOLVED ONLY THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE (U)NION-- PRIMARILY KEEPING THE MINUTES AND MEMBERSHIP ROLLS. I AM AWARE OF (THE ACTIVITY'S) CONTENTION THAT ALL OFFICERS IN THIS (U)NION HAD THE AUTHORITY TO HANDLE GRIEVANCES ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES. THE EXISTING PRESIDENT OF THE (U)NION TESTIFIED THAT, IN HIS OPINION, IF AN EMPLOYEE DEMANDED TO BE REPRESENTED BY A PARTICULAR (U)NION OFFICER IN A GRIEVANCE PROCEEDING, THE OFFICER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPRESENT THAT EMPLOYEE. EVEN IF I WERE CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS TRUE, I WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ACTUAL POLICY AND PRACTICE OF THE (U)NION RATHER THAN ANY AUTHORITY TECHNICALLY VESTED IN THE OFFICERS. THE ESTABLISHED PRACTICE WAS THAT ALL GRIEVANCES WERE HANDLED BY THE STEWARDS OR THE CHIEF SHOP STEWARD, AND ONLY ON RARE OCCASIONS WOULD THE (U)NION PRESIDENT BECOME INVOLVED. THE OTHER OFFICERS DID NOT PARTICIPATE. IN ADDITION, (THE EMPLOYEE) CLEARLY HAD NO INTENTION OF EVER HANDLING A GRIEVANCE. I DO NOT THINK THAT (THE EMPLOYEE) WOULD EVER HAVE PERFORMED ANY SORT OF REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES IN HER (U)NION JOB. AT BEST, THE CHANCES OF HER DOING SO WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOTE. THUS (THE ACTIVITY) HAS IMPROPERLY PORTRAYED (THE EMPLOYEE'S) POSITION WITH THE (U)NION AS BEING AN ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT AND AN ADVOCATE FOR EMPLOYEES. SINCE (THE EMPLOYEE'S) POSITION INVOLVING THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE (U)NION DID NOT RESULT IN ANY CONFLICT, OR APPARENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR INCOMPATIBILITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF (S)ECTION 1(B), IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING HER (U)NION OFFICE WHILE ACTING AS AN EEO COUNSELOR. I MUST CONCLUDE AND HOLD THAT (THE ACTIVITY'S) ACTION INTERFERED WITH HER (S)ECTION 1(A) RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE (U)NION AND CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF (S)ECTION 19()(1) OF THE ORDER . . . /2/ ACCORDINGLY, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ORDERED THE ACTIVITY TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM PROHIBITING THE EMPLOYEE FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY HOLDING THE POSITIONS OF EEO COUNSELOR AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-TREASURER-RECORDER FOR THE UNION, AND TO TAKE CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS. IN THE ACTIVITY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW, IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT "WAS BASED ON ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS (OF THE ALJ WHICH WERE) NOT REASONABLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE" IN THE RECORD. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE ALJ'S CONCLUSION THAT THE EMPLOYEE WAS NOT A "TRUE ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT BECAUSE SHE PERFORMED ONLY INTERNAL UNION BUSINESS," AND HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE EMPLOYEE "WAS NOT AN ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT BECAUSE SHE HAD NO INTENTION OF REPRESENTING EMPLOYEES," WERE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. IT IS FURTHER ALLEGED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION "PRESENTS A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE AS TO THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER," IN THAT IT RAISES THE QUESTION AS TO "WHETHER AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES ANY (U)NION OFFICER IS IN AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP TO (M)ANAGEMENT." IN THE AUTHORITY'S OPINION, THE AGENCY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. THAT IS, THE DECISION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOES NOT APPEAR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR RAISE ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUES. WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGATION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ACTED WITHOUT REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION IN REACHING HIS DECISION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. IN THIS REGARD, THE APPEAL FAILS TO SET FORTH ANY MATERIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DID NOT CONSIDER IN REACHING HIS DECISION, BUT INSTEAD CONSTITUTES ESSENTIALLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S CONCLUSION, BASED UPON THE ALJ'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS, AND THEREFORE PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR REVIEW. AS TO THE ALLEGATION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION PRESENTS A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A UNION OFFICER IS AN ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT, IN THE AUTHORITY'S VIEW NO BASIS FOR REVIEW IS THEREBY PRESENTED. IN THIS REGARD, THE AUTHORITY NOTES PARTICULARLY THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ADOPTED THE ALJ'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT THE EMPLOYEE'S UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT CASE INVOLVED ONLY THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION AND DID NOT INVOLVE THE HANDLING OF GRIEVANCES OR OTHER REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES, AND THEREFORE, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DID NOT RESULT IN ANY CONFLICT OR APPARENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER. ACCORDINGLY, THE ALLEGATION THAT THE EMPLOYEE, AS A UNION OFFICER, WAS AN ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT HEREIN CONSTITUTES ESSENTIALLY A MERE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S CONCLUSION, BASED UPON THE ALJ'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS, THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER BY PROHIBITING THE EMPLOYEE HEREIN FROM ACTING SIMULTANEOUSLY AS A PART-TIME EEO COUNSELOR AND AS A UNION OFFICER, AND THUS PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR AUTHORITY REVIEW. SINCE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION DOES NOT APPEAR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR PRESENT A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, THE APPEAL FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS HEREBY DENIED, AND THE REQUEST FOR A STAY IS ALSO DENIED. /3/ RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER CC: B. BRUNO AFGE REGION 7 FLRA /1/ THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ALSO IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ALJ, DISMISSED THE SECTION 19(A)(2) ALLEGATION OF THE COMPLAINT. THIS DETERMINATION HAS NOT BEEN APPEALED TO THE AUTHORITY AND THEREFORE IS NOT AT ISSUE HEREIN. /2/ THE ALJ FURTHER STATED THAT HE "NEED NOT DECIDE WHETHER A (U)NION OFFICER WHO COULD PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED A TRUE ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT WOULD BE PRECLUDED BY (SECTION) 1(B) FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY SERVING AS AN EEO COUNSELOR." /3/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224), THE INSTANT CASE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED. THE DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE ORDER.